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Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is commonly associated with the following three assumptions: (1) the components of the cognitive systems are characterized in terms of the causal relationships they bear to other components, as well as to inputs and outputs of the system, (2) the explanations provided by theories in psychology are irreducible to those provided by other, lower-level, theories, and (3) the discipline of psychology is autonomous.  All three assumptions are commonly seen as related to the notion of multiple realizability: The idea is that causal relationships can be instantiated by many different physical bases.  Hence, if mental states are characterized in a causal/functional way, they are multiply realizable.  This point has long been seen as implying irreducibility and autonomy of psychology (e.g. Fodor 1974; Putnam 1967).  The issue of multiple realizability in relation to reductionism and autonomy has recently been discussed by several authors (Kim 1992, 1999; Fodor 1997; Bechtel & Mundale 1999; Keeley 2000).  For example, Brian Keeley (2000) has argued that the issues of irreducibility and autonomy are independent of each other, and that the autonomy assumption can in fact be shown to be empirically false, even in cases where the processes in question are multiply realized.
In this paper, I present an argument that develops on Keeley’s point.  Keeley (2000) shows how the identification of the scientific kinds of psychology sometimes requires knowledge about the structures that realize them: “[T]he taxonomies of the special sciences are negotiated through the interaction of the special sciences with other sciences” (Keeley 2000, 451).  It seems that in such cases psychology is not autonomous.  However, if psychology is not autonomous, the question is what purpose is served by the scientific kinds of psychology that are being identified in this way.  An answer that suggests itself is that they play a role in psychological explanations. This raises the question of how psychology can provide genuine explanations if psychology is not autonomous.  I would like to suggest that the apparent paradox results from an equivocation of two notions of autonomy, which I will call “explanatory autonomy” and “methodological autonomy”.
-	A scientific discipline can be regarded as explanatorily autonomous if it can provide genuine explanatory statements, which appeal only to the taxonomic categories used within that discipline. 
-	A scientific discipline is methodologically autonomous if it can identify its taxonomic categories without appeal to other, lower-level, scientific disciplines
The thesis of this paper is that psychology can be explanatorily autonomous even if it is not methodologically autonomous.  Giving an argument for this thesis requires (a) providing an account of psychological explanation that is compatible with the notion that psychology is not methodologically autonomous, and (b) making the case that such explanations are autonomous.  The bulk of this paper is going to be concerned with the former question, but I will also make some suggestions concerning the latter question.
With respect to the problem of finding an account of psychological explanation that is compatible with a lack of methodological autonomy, I will be importantly drawing on Robert Cummins’ (1975, 1983) notion of “functional analysis”.  I shall argue that we need to distinguish between two notions of functional analysis.  According to the first notion (which was championed by Cummins), functional analysis is an explanatory strategy, which explains the behavioral capacities of a system by reference to the behavioral capacities of its parts.  According to the second notion, functional analysis is an investigative strategy, which identifies those parts.  I will propose a construal of this investigative strategy as applied to psychology that involves reference to the structure of the brain.

2. Functional Analysis and Psychological Explanation
In his first article on functional analysis, Robert Cummins (1975) presented an account of function ascriptions and their role in the study of complex systems.  In his book, The Nature of Psychological Explanation, Cummins (1983) applied his concept of functional analysis specifically to psychology.  According to this account, a given entity serves a function if it is involved in the realization of a capacity of the system the entity is contained in.  Thus, to discern how an organism exhibits a particular behavior is to ascribe a particular behavioral disposition or capacity to the organism and to analyze this disposition into its functional parts.  Once the workings of those functional parts are understood, the behavioral disposition is explained: “[F]unctions are appealed to in explaining the capacities of containing systems” (Cummins 1975, 751).  Historically, this account has to be seen in the context of a debate over the question by virtue of what appeal to function can be explanatory.  Cummins’ answer is generally contrasted with Wright’s etiological notion of function (Wright 1973).  An attractive feature of Cummins’ analysis was that it promised to elucidate a particular kind of scientific practice.  Thus, his aim was to “[give] attention to the characterization of the special explanatory strategy science employs in using functional language” (Cummins 1975, 757). 

2.1 Explanation by Analysis and Explanation by Subsumption
For Cummins, explanation by functional analysis is merely a sub-class of a broader type of explanations, explanations by analysis.  Such explanations are characterized by their explananda.  The explanandum of an explanation by analysis is a particular property of a system.  By contrast, an explanation by subsumption under a causal law explains why a system changes from one state to another state.  These two types of explanations correspond to two types of theories, “transition theories” and “property theories”.  A property theory asks what it is for a system to instantiate a property, and tries to answer this question by analyzing the system that has the property.  It then explains the property of the system in terms of the properties of its components and their mode of organization.  The important point, for Cummins, is that an explanation of a property by analysis is not (and is not to be confused with) a causal explanation.  The reason for this is simple: once we understand how a particular property is instantiated in a given system, we know what it is for that system to possess that property.  We explain the property by reference to the microstructural properties of the system that realizes the property.  In other words, the explanans is token-identical with the explanandum.  This rules out that the explanans causally explains the explanandum.
With respect to psychology, the properties of interest are dispositional properties.  Understanding what it is for a system to instantiate such properties calls for a particular type of analysis, i.e., functional analysis.  According to Cummins, psychology tries to provide such analyses, because it aims not simply at explaining individual instances of behavior, but rather at showing what it is for a particular type of system to have the disposition for particular types of behaviors.  It does so by breaking down the system’s behavioral disposition into the behavioral dispositions of the system’s component parts.  The result can be thought of as a flow-chart, where each box represents a functional component of the cognitive system.  For example, the human behavioral disposition to exhibit the primacy and recency effect, has been explained by a sequence of processes, which are assumed to take place in different memory stores (Baddeley 1986).​[1]​  These memory stores and their interactions can be represented as a flow-chart.  In other words, the disposition for the human cognitive system to exhibit the recency effect is token-identical with (and explained by) the dispositions of the different memory systems to be related by certain causal mechanisms, given certain triggering conditions.
Now, the “components” of the cognitive system, which I have been referring to, correspond to what philosophers of mind usually refer to as “mental states” or “mental processes”.  Within psychology, it is more common to call them “intervening variables,” i.e., entities that intervene between the triggering conditions and the outward behavior, and which are characterized in terms of certain functional characteristics.  Such intervening variables form an important part of the theoretical taxonomy of cognitive psychology.

2.2 Can Intervening Variables Be Identified?
Given the notion that explanations by functional analysis explain the behavioral dispositions of a system by appeal to the dispositions of variables to enter into a causal mechanism, the question is what those variables are.  A behavioral disposition can be broken down into more than one flow-chart.  This raises the question of whether there are any criteria for favoring one functional analysis over another.  One intuitive answer is that the functional analysis that describes the true causal mechanism should be favored, and that psychologists should proceed with an empirical investigation of what the true causal mechanism is.  The question, then, is how to identify the intervening variables in question.
Cummins himself (1983) is skeptical of the possibility of finding the true intervening variables.  Thus, psychological explanations by functional analysis can at best be “how possibly” explanations.​[2]​  He hints at two arguments to this effect.  According to the first, explanation by functional analysis does not involve reference to causal mechanisms, therefore the question of which mechanistic explanation is correct is nonsensical.  Explanations in psychology are not causal, but “interpretive” (Cummins 1983, 43).  However, in light of my above construal of functional analysis, this seems to be incorrect: Just because a property theory provides no causal explanations of the property in question, it does not follow that such a theory does not involve reference to the causal mechanisms that instantiate the property.  Furthermore, reference to this causal mechanism explains the output of the system in particular instances when the disposition is instantiated.  Cummins provides another argument against the identifiability of the true causal mechanism that instantiates a behavioral disposition.  According to this argument, the true mechanism is empirically underdetermined:
The fact that workable solutions are not unique and that the first one we hit on is not the only one (and may not be a very good one) is often forgotten simply because it is so difficult to come up with any workable solution at all.  But there is no reason that the criterion of explanatory usefulness selects a unique solution as the correct solution. (Cummins 1983, 37)

It seems that the argument is the following:  Psychology explains behavioral dispositions (input/output-functions) by analyzing these capacities into component parts, which are themselves dispositions (i.e., little input/output-functions).  Any input/output function can be calculated by many different algorithms (and executed by a different sequence of intervening variables).  Therefore, the correct intervening mechanism is in principle empirically underdetermined.
This second argument for the underdetermination of psychological explanation is shared by some prominent proponents of modern cognitive psychology.  For example, John R. Anderson (1990) distinguishes between two levels of description in psychology, (a) the implementation-level, which aims at giving the physical mechanism that mediates between input and output, and (b) the algorithm-level, which models behavioral input/output-functions.  Anderson argues that a psychology that confines itself to behavioral data will have to stop at the algorithm level.  But since any mathematical function can be computed by many different algorithms (and executed by many different mechanisms), it is very unlikely that psychology will hit on the true mechanism:
[I]t is just not possible to use behavioral data to develop a theory of the implementation level in the concrete and specific terms to which we have aspired. […] There are many mechanisms that can compute the same input-output functions.  Consequently, identifying the behavioral function will not identify the mechanism.  So, behavioral data will never tell us what is in the mind at the implementation level.  It is time we stop fooling ourselves. (Anderson 1990, 24)

If we take Anderson’s argument to be what is behind Cummins’ claims, it becomes clear that the conclusion (the empirical underdetermination of cognitive mechanisms) rests on a particular premise.  The premise in question is that psychology is confined to behavioral data.  It seems to me that this premise is closely related to the assumption of methodological autonomy, mentioned at the beginning of this paper.  There are two possible replies to this premise.  The first is to accept the autonomy premise, but to argue that it is in fact possible to identify the true intervening variables solely on the basis of behavioral data.  The second is to question the assumption of methodological autonomy.  This latter strategy is the one that will be pursued in the remainder of this paper.  I will proceed in two steps: First, I will present a construal of functional analysis that does not presuppose methodological autonomy (section 3).  Then I will discuss (and reject) some arguments for methodological autonomy (section 4).

3. Functional Analysis as an Investigative Strategy
How could functional analysis conceivably identify the true intervening variables in psychology?  One suggestion is to think of the intervening variables postulated by the analysis as hypotheses about the causal roles played by system components.  Thus construed, one part of functional analysis consists in looking for the physical components that occupy these causal roles.  Only after this has been done can a functional analysis be appealed to in an explanation.  This is precisely how Cummins has been interpreted by some authors.  For example, Amundsen and Lauder (1994), construing Cummins in this way, observe that functional analysis can be found in various areas of biology, most notably functional anatomy.  According to them, the task of functional anatomy consists in correlating certain functional properties of an organism with certain structural (anatomical) features.  A functional characterization of an intervening variable specifies certain causal roles, and thereby makes certain suggestions as to the causal properties of the system components one is looking for.  However, such a functional characterization needs to be supplemented by a structural characterization of the system component and its behavior, such that the two can be matched.  This requires that a functional characterization of the property in question, and a structural characterization of the component that realizes it, can be given independently.  Amundsen and Lauder clearly think that this last requirement is unproblematic. “In the functional anatomists’ vocabulary, form and function were both observable, experimentally measurable attributes of anatomical items” (Amundsen & Lauder 1994, 449).

3.1 Searching for the Physical Occupier of a Causal Role
This proposal bears a certain resemblance to some recent accounts of the discovery process in the biological sciences (Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Craver & Darden 2001).  For example, Bechtel and Richardson (1993) state that “[a] major part of developing a mechanistic explanation is […] to determine what the components of the system are and what they do” (Bechtel & Richardson 1993, 18).  The authors make it clear that a hypothesis as to what a component does is going to guide the search for it.  They distinguish between two strategies that are in play in the process of looking for the component in question: decomposition and localization.  The strategy of (task-) decomposition is essentially what Cummins means by functional analysis, i.e. the subdivision of a particular type of behavior into functionally characterized components.  This strategy, then, is complemented with that of localization, which consists in the identification of physical parts of the system in which particular functions can be localized.  The question is how the two strategies work together.  A proposal with respect to this question can be found in Craver and Darden (2001, 123).  The authors state that a purely top-down analysis of the phenomenon to be explained “cannot itself exhaust the discovery of a mechanism.  One also has to know the components of the mechanism and how they are realized” (Craver & Darden 1999, 13).  In other words, a purely functional individuation of components is not sufficient for what they call a “how-actually-explanation”.  In addition, knowledge about neurological entities and mechanisms provide “componency constraints”, knowledge about the spatial organization of those components provide “spatial constraints”, and knowledge about the order, rate, duration and frequency of neural processes provides “temporal constraints”.  Thus, drawing on knowledge about the entities and processes that potentially realize the causal roles of the hypothetical intervening variables posited by a Cummins-style functional analysis, narrows down the conceptual space of such an analysis.  But not only that, it also makes possible two new classes of experiments designed to further narrow down the entities and mechanisms in question.  These are experiments that either intervene on the neurological level (by removing certain parts of the brain) and observe effects such a manipulation has on the behavior, or intervene on the behavior level (by setting experimental subjects certain behavioral tasks) and recording nerve activity (see Craver & Darden op. cit, 19ff.).
The authors just mentioned clearly share the intuition that a full account of the workings of a system requires both functional and structural language.  Functional decompositions of the behavioral capacities of a system guide the process of looking for physical components and their dispositional properties, but such a search also requires that those components can in principle be individuated independently of a purely functional decomposition.

4. Functional Analysis and the Autonomy of Psychology
I have suggested that Cummins’ underdetermination argument is an artifact of the premise that psychology has to confine itself to behavioral data.  In the previous section, I have proposed an account of functional analysis that does not make this assumption, and instead draws on both behavioral and neurological data.  Now, the suggestion that psychology does not have to limit itself to behavioral data, in the search for intervening variables (a) does not rule out the possibility that it might also be capable of discovering them on the basis of purely behavioral data, and (b) does not guarantee that intervening variables can be identified, even if it uses neurological data.  A discussion of these two issues would be beyond the scope of this paper.  For now, I will limit my attention to the question of whether there are any non question-begging reasons for believing that psychology must use only behavioral data.  I take this question to be synonymous with the question of whether there is any reason to suppose that psychology has to be methodologically autonomous.  A standard argument for the autonomy of psychology is that psychological processes (or states) are multiply realizable.

4.1 Multiple Realizability and Some Of Its Implications
The notion of multiple realizability can in principle be read in two different ways, i.e. (1) as an empirical claim (according to which we find that one and the same phenomenon is realized in several different ways), and (2) as a metaphysical claim (according to which a particular phenomenon, qua being individuated functionally, can be realized in an indefinite number of ways).  Fodor (1974) hints at both versions.  In this section, I will focus on the first one.
The empirical claim of multiple realizability, too, can be interpreted in at least two ways.  A particular input-output-function can be multiply realized (a) by virtue of the fact that it is realized by radically different intervening variables, and (b) by virtue of the fact that the same kind of intervening variables are realized by different kinds of physical bases.  These two cases are interestingly different, and each of them have been addressed in the recent literature on multiple realization.  For example, Keeley (2000) addresses the second possibility.  He presents the case of a behavior of several different species of electric fish, arguing that the functional organization that makes this behavior possible is similar in all three species, despite the fact that these components are not all realized by the same type of biological materials (in some species, the electric organ is realized by nervous tissue, in others by muscle tissue).  Bechtel and Mundale (1999), on the other hand, address the first possibility of multiple realization, arguing that with respect to systems of the brain there is a lot less inter-individual variation than suggested by the common handwaving appeal to multiple realization. If this is the case, and if brain systems serve particular functions, then it would seem that they have to be physical realizers of the causal roles individuated by psychological explanations.  Consequently, knowing what brain systems are involved in the production of a particular behavior would help identifying the true intervening variables of a psychological explanation.

4.2 Two Concepts of Autonomy and the Question of Reduction
The above suggests that psychology is not methodologically autonomous.  However, this raises the question of whether psychology can provide genuine explanations if it does not proceed autonomously in the identification of its theoretical taxonomy.  In other words, can psychology be explanatorily autonomous if it is not methodologically autonomous?  I want to argue that psychology can provide genuine explanations, even if it does not arrive at those explanations in an autonomous fashion, and the kinds of explanations it offers are explanations by functional analysis.  In the following sub-section, I will provide a sketch of an argument for the explanatory autonomy of psychology.  In the remainder of this sub-section, I will argue that this issue should not be conflated with that of reductionism.
Explanatory autonomy is sometimes taken to be implied by irreducibility.  For example, Fodor argues that psychological kinds are multiply realized; hence psychological theories are irreducible, hence psychological explanations are autonomous (Fodor, 1997).  According to Rosenberg (2001), one of the main points of being an antireductionist is to argue that the special sciences can provide genuine explanations.  However, I think I can have explanatory autonomy without committing myself to any stance on the issue of reductionism.  In other words, explanatory autonomy may be a consequence of irreducibility, but it does not follow that irreducibility is a necessary condition for explanatory autonomy.  The reason why it is desirable to divorce the issue of explanatory autonomy from that of the reductionism/antireductionism debate is that there are many problems in trying to apply traditional models of theory-reduction to the relationship between psychology and neuroscience or physics (Rosenberg 2001).  Two responses have been to either propose improved models of reduction (Kim 1998; Bickle 1998), or to call into question the usefulness of the concept (Machamer et al., 2000; Machamer & Sullivan, 2001).  In the present context I am remaining agnostic with respect to this issue.  Instead I will focus on the issue of what makes a psychological explanation explanatory.

4.3 Defending Explanatory Autonomy
The issue is put nicely by Rosenberg (2001).  One of the problems with reductionism, he says, is that it presupposes the existence of theories and laws in the reduced science.  But it is not clear in what sense of the word there are theories and laws in psychology.  Hence, reductionism cannot work.  But if that’s the case, this is also an argument against explanatory autonomy.  How are psychological statements explanatory, if not by virtue of expressing a lawful regularity, which is embedded in a well-confirmed psychological theory?  The answer, I suggest, is that psychological statements are explanatory by virtue of (a) providing an analysis of what it is for a given kind of system to have a particular behavioral disposition, and (b) providing the mechanism that instantiates the disposition in any given instance.  In other words: psychological explanations are explanations by functional analysis.
Now, it might be objected that the explanatory work in such explanations is being done not by the psychology but the neuroscience.  In response, I want to concede that perhaps a consequence of not requiring methodological autonomy is that the science we are dealing with is going to be cognitive neuropsychology.  Nonetheless, I claim that the explanations are going to be psychological explanations, because they appeal to psychological categories, which are characterized functionally (e.g., memory systems).  And for that reason, references to such categories enjoy a certain explanatory autonomy.
To back this up, let us remind ourselves of the second of the two senses of “multiple realizability” mentioned above.  To be a function-category, by definition, is to be multiply realizable, regardless of whether it is in fact multiply realized.  This is Fodor’s reply to Kim (Fodor 1997, Kim 1992).  This means that any given functional state can in principle be realized in indefinitely many different ways.  Fodor concludes that what we want are explanations that generalize over all these cases.  And the reason why we are entitled to treat such explanations as autonomous is that the entities (intervening variables) we invoke are individuated functionally.  As Fodor (1990) puts it, the locomotion of a sailboat can be explained by reference to its possession of a sail (in conjunction with certain environmental conditions).  Knowledge of what the sail is made of does not add anything to that explanation.  In a similar vein, Kitcher (1984) has argued that the details of molecular implementations are irrelevant to the explanatory power of cytological explanations.
However, I believe that in light of my argument about the nature of functional analysis, Fodor’s point must be qualified in an important way: Knowledge of what the sail is made of does not add anything to the explanation of why the boat sails.  But knowledge that there actually is an entity that performs this function is crucial to the validity of the explanation.  In other words, appeal to functional individuated entities is explanatory even if as a matter of empirical fact they are not multiply realized.  But such appeal is explanatory only if we have independent evidence for the existence of such functionally individuated entities.  On the construal presented in this paper, it is the job of functional analysis to provide such evidence.

5. Conclusion
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^1	 FOOTNOTES When presented with a list of items, human subjects typically remember the first and last items on the list better than the items that appear in the middle (see Dawson, 1998, for an overview of functional analyses of this phenomenon).
^2	  See Machamer et al. (2000) for the distinction between how-possibly, how plausibly, and how-actually explanations.
